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Why Believe in Contentless Beliefs? 
Daniel D. Hutto  
“Psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view 
we take of belief our philosophical outlook largely depends”.  
– Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, Lecture xii, 1921  
1. Introduction  
This paper motivates the idea that the most basic kind of believing is a contentless 
attitude. It gives reasons for thinking that the most basic sort of belief – the sort that both 
we and other animals adopt toward situations – does not represent those situations in 
truth-evaluable ways. I call such attitudes pure intentional attitudes. They are not 
propositional attitudes, which I take to be linguistically mediated intentional attitudes.  
The main claim to be defended in this paper is that not only is it coherently conceivable 
that the most basic kinds of beliefs are intentional attitudes – i.e. attitudes that exhibit a 
basic intentionality despite lacking content – but that we have every reason to believe in 
such states of mind. I call such attitudes pure intentional attitudes in order to distinguish 
them, conceptually, from propositional attitudes (see Hutto 1999, 2008a, 2008b). The 
latter are also directed at situations – and so qualify as intentional attitudes, but they 
differ from pure intentional attitudes in being contentful.  
On the assumption that intentionality necessarily implies content the above suggestion 
will strike some as obviously absurd. But as I argue in sections 3 and 4 below (in line 
with more detailed arguments supplied elsewhere) the assumption that intentionality 
implies content is a questionable one – it over-intellectualizes the basic mind, reading 
properties into it that only belong to the sorts of minds that are built atop it (Hutto 2011, 
2012, Hutto and Myin 2013).  
If the idea of a contentless intentional attitude is tenable it puts us in a position to re-
assess the root nature of belief. As a class, beliefs have a distinctive, if somewhat 
flexible, profile: they play characteristic roles in shaping our thinking and acting. These 
roles can be specified with more or less precision. It is by playing such roles beliefs are 
marked out as beliefs and not other attitudes, such as opining or hoping. But all beliefs 
exhibit a basic directedness; they target particular states of affairs. In addition some 
beliefs have propositional content. Beliefs of the latter sort are propositional attitudes. 
But if this analysis is right, far from being the paradigm of belief – as many philosophers 
hold, propositional attitudes are a sub-class of a more general type of believing attitude – 
intentional attitudes.  
This essay challenges the popular idea that necessarily any belief is a propositional 
attitude. Section 2 describes the Content Requirement and what it entails for our 
understanding of belief. Sections 3 and 4 examine problems that arise for two standard 
proposals to non-verbal attitudes that respect the Content Requirement when it comes to 
making sense of our ordinary attributional practices.1 The first attempt, discussed in 
Section 3, is implausible given the negative prospects of developing a metaphysically 
acceptable theory of non-linguistic content. The second way of handling non-verbal 
attitudes, by denying that they can qualify as beliefs at all, is reviewed in Section 4. This 
proposal is problematic even when it is augmented by assuming that non-verbal attitudes 
might be a kind of belief-like contentful attitude. For the latter idea runs into the same 
trouble as the accounts discussed in Section 3; it too has no prospect of explaining the 
content of such attitudes. Taking a different tack, Section 5 shows how an analysis of 
belief that allows for intentional but contentless attitudes – and thus rejects the Content 
Requirement – (a) enables us to best deal with prominent puzzles about how to ascribe 
beliefs in certain cases and also (b) reveals what lies at the core of all cases of believing 
(while recognizing that believing comes in many forms).  
2. The Content Requirement  
It is widely supposed that beliefs, whatever other features they possess, must have 
content. Nothing counts as a belief if it lacks content. Call this the ‘Content 
Requirement’. This seems to be an inviolable conceptual or analytic truth in light of the 
fact that if an individual holds a belief it must be possible to ask what it is that the 
individual believes. And, for many, that alone settles the matter. For they take ‘what is 
believed’ to be the content of a belief.  
I think we have no choice but to raise doubts about this philosophical ruling – at least 
questioning its universality. While it is perfectly true that propositional attitudes are 
contentful – as one might say, ‘by their very nature’ – there are reasons for thinking that 
not everything that legitimately falls into the class of beliefs is a propositional attitude. 
Put otherwise, not all beliefs are propositional attitudes – despite what many philosophers 
are inclined to think. There can be contentless intentional attitudes.  
To understand what is being claimed it is important to first establish what it means to say 
that an attitude is contentful. What is content, exactly? As Jackson and Pettit (1993) point 
out, “‘Content’ is a recently prominent term of art and may well mean different things to 
different practitioners of the art” (p. 269). Philosophers distinguish at least two senses of 
content – intensional content and extensional content. This distinction is well known and 
is easily illustrated by considering the sorts of examples that Frege made famous. Some 
co-extensive but intensionally distinguishable thoughts include:  
1. The author of 1984 is George Orwell. 
2. The author of 1984 is Eric Blair. 
3. Next Tuesday is the first day of April. 
4. Next Tuesday is April fool’s day. 
5. Next Tuesday is the first day of the month named after Aphrodite in the Julian 
calendar. 
Beliefs, like many other mental states, exhibit ‘aboutness’ – they are directed at or target 
states of affairs, whether real or imaginary. Beliefs have subject matters or, as some 
philosophers are wont to say, they have extensional content. Here ‘content’ just means 
what a mental state is directed at or what it targets – e.g. some possible state of affairs. 
But beliefs are also thought to have intensional contents, necessarily. Indeed a number of 
philosophers suppose that it is the intensional (with an ‘s’) contents of such attitudes that 
mediate genuinely cognitive activity. They are moved by the thought that it is how we 
think about what we think about which matters cognitively. With this in mind, for 
example, contemporary defenders of representational theories of mind psychologise 
Frege’s notion of ‘Sinn’ or ‘sense’ when thinking about the properties of mental states 
that are manipulated in reasoning processes; i.e. mental states with content. In line with 
this, intensional contents are variously construed as: abstract entities; bits of Language of 
Thought syntax; or interpretative takes.  
Are there really two kinds of content? Is there what is believed – i.e. the extensional 
content?, and in addition, a mode of presentation (or the equivalent) – i.e. the intensional 
content – a way of ‘grasping’ what is believed? Extensional contents might be Russellian 
propositions. Russellian propositions are structured entities with which we can be 
intellectually acquainted. In modern parlance they are often identified with facts or 
obtaining states of affairs because they are structures composed of individuals, properties 
and relations. Nevertheless, this easy assimilation overlooks special properties of 
components of Russellian propositions and the complexes themselves. Although Russell 
thought of them as forming the ultimate bedrock of the world, he also conceived of them 
as – essentially – potential objects of thought. He imagined them not only to be facts but 
also, at once, propositional contents.  
Accordingly, “True mental content is identical with worldly facts; it does not correspond 
to them … the content of the thought is the worldly fact” (Rowlands 2006, p. 24, 
emphasis original).  
Yet, as Stalnaker (1998) helpfully reminds us, “it is essential to propositional contents 
that they have truth conditions” (p. 341). Given this, how might something be both a fact 
– an obtaining state of affairs – and a proposition at the same time? Well, “One might … 
identify the content with the truth conditions themselves” (ibid, p. 343). On this view, 
that which makes a given thought true is the very object of thought itself.  
Nevertheless positing the existence of Russellian propositions is not without 
philosophical problems. I won’t rehearse these here (but see Hutto 20003/2006 Ch. 1 for 
a discussion). Suffice to say that we ought to take seriously William James’s (1909) 
views on these matters. He, long ago, exposed the fundamental confusion in Russell’s 
thinking. James argued that the mistake is to conflate facts, or realities, with truths. On 
Russell’s view great swathes of the world are literally composed of ‘as yet unthought’ 
contents. If, by contrast, we follow James’s lead we can, without such metaphysical 
extravagance, swap a commitment to the existence of such contents for talk of virtual 
truths; that is, of truths that could and would be expressed if someone were to express 
them.  
Accordingly, truth conditions only come into being when there are creatures that actually 
form propositional attitudes about some or other state of affairs. Hence, “If there is to be 
truth … both realities and beliefs about them must conspire to make it” (James 1909, p. 
197). Strictly speaking, the existence of truth conditions, according to James, depends on 
the formation of contentful beliefs about worldly states of affairs. This is because: 
“Realities are not true, they are: and beliefs are true of them” (ibid, p. 196). James puts 
philosophical confusion on this score down to what he describes as the ‘vulgar’ tendency 
to confuse ‘truths’ with ‘facts’ (ibid, pp. 78, 144, 223).  
In all, Russellians owe us a convincing argument for thinking that facts logically entail 
contents. Surely, we are not compelled to accept this as a truism. If anything, prima facie, 
things seem to be as Bermúdez (2011) describes them:  
Propositions are very different from states of affairs. In particular, propositions are true 
or  
false, while states of affairs are not the sort of things that can be either true or false. On  
many standard ways of thinking about propositions and states of affairs, states of affairs  
are the things that make propositions true or false (p. 404).  
To avoid buying into an extravagant metaphysics – or at the very least until it is 
acknowledged decisively that we should follow Russell over James – we would do better 
to reserve the notion of content exclusively for what is believed about X. If so, we get the 
following rule: To be in a contentful state of mind is to be in an intensional state of mind 
that is directed at some possible state of affairs.  
One more wrinkle: Being in an intensional state of mind equates to representing the 
world in a way that has specifiable conditions of satisfaction. To use the familiar 
illocution, minimally this requires representing things as being a certain way. It has been 
much debated in recent years whether representing the world in this way entails a 
capacity for conceptual representation. Some adopt hard line views on this issue. 
Speaking for conceptualists Fodor, for example, holds that ‘representing as’, having 
concepts and intensional states of mind come as a package deal. He thinks that we can 
see this by considering the putative fact that “To represent (e.g. mentally) Mr. James as a 
cat is to represent him falling under the concept CAT” (Fodor 2007, p. 105).  
It is easy to see why one might think there are unbreakable logical connections here since 
“the word concept with its contemporary meaning, on which concepts are something like 
mental or semantic representations, [is] closer to the realm of sense than that of 
reference” (Williamson 2007, p. 30). What is of interest is that Fodor takes this quite a bit 
further, claiming that “The mark of the mental is its intensionality (with an ‘s’) that’s to 
say that mental states have content” (Fodor, London Review of Books, 12 Feb 2009).  
Most philosophers would, no doubt, question the claim that intensionality tout court is 
the mark of the mental. Despite this, many would find it quite plausible that 
intensionality is the mark of belief; a view that is consistent with acceptance of a variety 
of theories of concepts and theories of content. That is, they are likely inclined to accept 
the ‘Content Requirement’ in the very sense Fodor understands it as a general rule about 
the nature of belief. It is this rule, so understood, that I seek to challenge.  
3. Non-Verbal Believing: Take One 
What should we say about Malcolm’s barking dog (cf. Malcolm 1997, pp. 49-50)? 
Imagine a scenario in which a dog sees a cat, gives chase, barking madly. The cat leaps 
into a tree. The dog circles around the tree’s base, continuing to bark. Yet unbeknownst 
to it the cat slips away. It continues to bark.  
We are naturally inclined to attribute to the dog the belief that ‘There is a cat up the tree’. 
Yet there is no wider interpretive evidence, based on its counterfactual behaviours or 
wider patterns of response to justify the assumption that it operates with the concepts 
‘tree’ or ‘cat’. Or, to put the point more carefully, prima facie, taking everything about 
the dog’s full repertoire of behavior into account we have no grounds for supposing that 
it has the requisite concepts to form the belief. Or if we are very liberal in our thinking 
about what is required for concept possession then we have no evidence for thinking the 
dog has command of concepts in ways that would warrant speaking of the dog as 
entertaining propositions about how things stand with the ‘tree’ and the ‘cat’.2  
Our unease about assigning conceptual content in this case is easily brought out by the 
fact that the belief attribution is made on the fly – it is wholly driven by the particulars of 
the given case; by features of the episode and what the dog responds to in the immediate 
environment. There seems to be no way to interrogate the dog further to discover what 
the best way is to characterize its state of mind. Thus, had we seen the dog chase a 
squirrel up the tree (and assuming that the rest of the story stays the same: the squirrel 
subsequently leaves the tree while the dog continues barking, and so on) would we be 
warranted in attributing the dog a belief with a different content? Would the dog be 
making the mistake of thinking that there is a squirrel in the tree? Or would he be doubly 
wrong in thinking that (a) the squirrel is a cat and (b) the cat is still in the tree? Or is the 
dog operating with a more general concept and thinking only that there is ‘something 
chaseable’ in the tree? What sort of mistake is the dog making? These questions easily 
multiply but there appears to be no principled way to answer them. The nub is that, “We 
want to say the dog believes something – but we do not seem able to say 
what” (Armstrong 1973, p. 25, cf. also Stich 1979, p. 18).  
As long as we remain faithful to the content requirement this is a puzzle, for if the dog 
believes then it must believe something. Perhaps there is no real problem here. For 
“although we may find ourselves forced, implausibly, to describe animal and infant 
thoughts using adult humans concepts and categories, this is our problem not theirs” (cf. 
Carruthers 1998, p. 220). A natural way to defend this idea is to support the hypothesis 
that non-linguistic believers operate with a Fodorian lingua mentis (or something near 
enough). Carruthers (2009b) takes this route. He defends the view that many nonverbal 
animals – even invertebrates, such as honeybees – have full-fledged propositional 
attitudes. Their contentful attitudes interact with one another in immediate, first order 
ways and thereby produce actions. This is possible, he holds, precisely because the 
contents of these mental states are composed of distinct, conceptual components.  
Consider, for example, a honeybee’s thought with the content [nectar is 200 meters north 
of the hive] (or some near equivalent). Is this genuinely composed of the concepts nectar, 
200 meters (or some roughly equivalent measure of distance), north (or some similar 
solar-based measure of direction), and hive? Well, yes. (Carruthers 2009b, p. 98) 
Carruthers goes further still. In an extreme move, he holds that what we regard as 
paradigms of human belief – verbalized judgements and commitments of the sort 
associated with explicit, conscious, ‘system 2’ thinking – are too removed from the 
coalface of cognitive activity, where real thinking gets done, to count as bona fide 
propositional attitudes.  
Obviously, this is a shocking proposal. To take it seriously would violate our everyday 
attributional practices. Surely, our best and most secure evidence for the existence of 
beliefs construed as propositional attitudes comes from intricate and holistically 
interwoven patterns of behaviour exhibited in linguistically mediated reasoning and 
utterance, over time. It is for just this reason that we run into trouble in capturing what it 
is that the dog thinks. Yet despite this, by Carruthers’s lights, such expressive activity 
“doesn’t … involve any propositional attitudes … [thus] distinctively human thoughts are 
mere faux-thoughts compared to those we share with non-human animals … the real 
thing is done by animals” (Carruthers 2009b, pp. 106-107).  
That only animal minds (including the animal minds of humans) exhibit real cognition is 
motivated by the assumption that this is where we find true content, the kind of content 
that causally explains the production of action. This content comes on the scene long 
before language does. Cognitive science is founded on this idea. It assumes that minds 
basically manipulate informational contents in well-defined ways in order to yield other, 
more interesting representations that interact in ways that eventuate in action. This 
thought trades on the textbook idea that informational content is a kind of basic 
commodity – the raw material of basic cognition.  
To qualify as representational, an inner state must play a special kind of role in a larger 
cognitive economy. Crudely, it must, so to speak, have the function of saying or 
indicating that things stand thus and so, and be consumed by other systems because of its 
capacity to say or indicate how things stand. On this familiar view, trading in 
informational content is the basis of cognition. Nonetheless, as Wheeler (1995) 
underscores, this does not imply that the sub-systems “in any literal sense understand that 
information” (p. 218). But, even if they literally lack understanding of what they are 
dealing with, if this account is to have teeth then the imagined subsystems must 
nevertheless be literally trafficking in informational contents. They must be using and 
fusing these, even if they don’t understand what such contents say.  
But talk of using and fusing contents, although quite common, cannot be taken literally 
either. Cognitive scientists and other theorists use a range of metaphors to describe what 
is done with information (and different kinds of information content) in the fuelling of 
cognitive activity. Information is said to be extracted, retrieved, picked-up, fused, 
bounded up, integrated, brought together, stored, used for later processing and so on and 
so forth. How seriously should we take this talk?  
At root, there must be some genuine way to explain what informational ‘content’ is and 
what it is for subpersonal mechanisms to ‘communicate’ with one another in terms of it –
one that gets its force and meaning by drawing analogies with the communicative 
practices of those who have mastered language (for detailed arguments see Hutto and 
Myin 2013). Otherwise it seems we must accept that talk of the reception, manipulation 
and production of content at this level is, as McDowell (1994/1998) noted some time 
ago, “irreducibly metaphorical” (p. 349).3  
Now, it might be thought that the explanatory successes of positing contents in such 
systems obviates the need to supply a theory of content – that the explanatory need to 
make such attributions and the value of doing so is justification enough for taking them 
very seriously. But the value of representational talk has been brought into question even 
more fundamentally in recent times. Ramsey (2007), for example, raises ‘the job 
description challenge’ which identifies a “specific condition that needs to be met if a 
theoretical notion of representation is going to be explanatorily useful. Besides some 
account of what determines the content for a given state, we also (and perhaps more 
importantly) need an account of how the structure or state in question actually serves as a 
representation in (and for) the system”  
(p. 124). Ramsey’s considered assessment is that in a great many cases this challenge is 
not met in the cognitive sciences.  
The best bet for those hoping to establish that animal minds are truly contentful minds 
(indeed ‘the’ truly contentful minds) is to try to augment purely functional accounts in 
order to show that the function or purpose of informationally sensitive responding might 
suffice, at least in some cases, and thus constitute a kind of contentful representing. 
Accordingly the interpretative response of the system does all of the work in fixing the 
content of a representation. To take this line is to surrender any and all commitment to 
the idea that informational content exists independently of the activities of cognitive 
agents; thus the responses of organisms carry all of the weight in fixing content. This idea 
gets its most developed expression in the work of Millikan (1984, 1993, 2004). As she 
makes clear, according to her consumer-based theory of content, “the content of a 
representation is determined, in a very important part, by the system that interprets 
it” (Millikan 2005, p. 100, emphasis added).  
At first glance this is promising. Teleosemantic proposals are the clear front-runners 
among existing naturalistic proposals that seek to provide something-more-than-
covariance in order to explain representing. Teleosemantic theories promise to account 
for the representational properties of mental states, by focusing on the purposeful way 
that certain kinds of organismic responding to aspects of an environment answers 
consumer needs. The guiding idea of this theory of content is that a device will have the 
teleofunction of representing Xs if it is used, interpreted, or consumed by the system 
because it has the proper function of representing the presence of Xs. Talk of proper 
function is meant to emphasize that content is fixed by what organisms are supposed to 
do in their interpretative activity as opposed to what they are merely disposed to do. 
Despite the normative language, the intention is to explain representational properties in 
wholly naturalistic terms; by appeal to standards set, for example, by natural selection 
and individual learning and training.  
There is, however, a well-known technical problem with teleosemantic proposals which 
threatens to cripple them. Compelling arguments show that it can, at best, account for 
states of mind exhibiting intentional (with a ‘t’) directedness but it flounders when it 
comes to accounting for states of mind exhibiting intensionality (with an ‘s’) – and the 
latter are required for having properly referential and truth-evaluable thoughts. Fodor 
(1990b) observed that selectionist explanations, like historical explanations, are 
transparent (i.e. extensional). This being so explanations in terms of proper functions do 
not suffice to specify the putative intensional content of naturally evolved states of mind. 
The assumption that representational states of mind gain their semantic content by having 
biological proper functions runs into serious trouble. Appealing to biology alone proves 
incapable of specifying under what guise such states represent what they target (indeed, 
this leads to deeper questions about why they would need to represent anything at all in 
order to do their work).  
The best response to Fodor’s objection is to insist that content is determined by the needs 
of the consumer. One way to achieve this would be to look at what in the historical 
environment originally shaped the ancestor organisms so as to determine what their 
current descendants are meant to target. Accordingly, the putative semantic content of 
representations are fixed by what in fact originally promoted the continued proliferation 
of such representational devices, where the latter were ‘selected for’ targeting Xs not Ys 
or Zs (assuming Xs, Ys, and Zs are co-extensive). This sort of reply, championed by 
Millikan (1993), misses its mark. For it still only enables us to decide what a particular 
sort of device would have had to target, and thus what it now targets, extensionally 
speaking. But that does not get at the heart of Fodor’s worry.  
To see why, let us assume that an appeal to biological proper functions tells us what a 
certain device or response is meant to be targeting. Take that as given. Still we have 
exactly no reason to think that in such cases the targeted item is represented in a truth 
conditional, referential or any other semantic way that is comparable to the semantics of 
natural language. Fodor’s objection is not dealt with. As he notes he is not concerned 
with the tension “between Darwinism and theories that are intentional (with a ‘t’) but the 
tension between Darwinism and theories that are intensional (with an ‘s’)” (p. 1). 
Remarkably, on this, even Fodor and Putnam agree. Thus the latter tells us:  
The ‘reference’ we get out of … hypothetical natural selection will be just the reference  
we put in our choice of a description. Evolution won’t give you more intentionality than  
you pack into it (Putnam 1992, p. 33).  
There are positive lessons to learn from this polemic. With important adjustments, much 
can be salvaged from teleosemantic attempts to naturalize representational content.  
Teleosemantic accounts fail to provide an adequate basis for naturalizing content of the 
sort that is comparable to that exhibited by speech acts of natural language. Nevertheless 
they provide adequate tools for making sense of something more modest – i.e. responses 
involving only intentionality understood as a kind of targeted directedness. Biologically 
based accounts of proper functions can reasonably deliver the latter.  
Some may baulk at counting such directedness as any kind of intentionality. Such 
resistance is to be expected from anyone who holds that intentionality necessarily entails 
content. But what might justify that assumption? Well, it might be thought that 
intentional directedness must be fixed by mental content. That idea will be attractive as 
long as one subscribes to some version of the Fregean dictate that ‘Sense (viz. intensional 
content) determines reference’. In the hands of those who model mental content on 
linguistic content the Fregean credo gets augmented by the further thought that 
“Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in the same sense of ‘represent’ 
that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs” (1983, p. 5, emphasis added). 
Voilà! By this quick chain of reasoning we secure the result that intentionality entails the 
existence of content with semantic properties of the sort exhibited by the speech acts of 
natural language.  
As we have just seen, a close examination of what teleosemantic accounts can offer 
reveals that securing this strong notion of content was never really on the cards (Hutto 
2011, 2012). At best such accounts can provide something weaker. Even those who were 
initially optimistic about the prospects of teleosemantics concur. Godfrey-Smith (2006) 
provides an astute assessment “there is a growing suspicion that we have been looking 
for the wrong kind of theory, in some big sense. Naturalistic treatments of semantic 
properties have somehow lost proper contact with the phenomena” (p. 42). Nevertheless, 
it is acknowledged that the driving idea behind teleosemantics – that evolved structures 
can have a kind of ‘specificity’ or ‘directedness’ – is essentially correct: “there is an 
important kind of natural involvement relation that is picked out by selection-based 
concepts of function. But this relation is found in many cases that do not involve 
representation or anything close to it” (ibid, p. 60).  
In short, it is becoming clear to many in the field that purely biologically based accounts 
lack the right resources for naturalizing properly semantic properties, such as states of 
mind exhibiting truth conditions and reference.4 If we reject teleosemantics in favour of 
teleosemiotics we can borrow what is best from the former, and covariance accounts of 
information, in order to provide a content-free naturalistic account of the determinate 
intentional directedness that organisms exhibit towards aspects of their environments 
(Hutto 2008b, ch. 3, Hutto and Myin 2013). This requires abandoning the attempt to 
understand the most basic forms of directedness in semantic terms – i.e. in terms of 
contentful states of mind that refer or have truth or accuracy conditions. This is to accept 
that organisms often act successfully by making appropriate responses to objects or states 
affairs in ways that are only directly mediated by their sensitive responding to natural 
signs, where this responding does not involve contentfully representing the objects or 
states of affairs in question.  
4. Non-Verbal Believing: Take Two  
The previous section pushes us to conclude that creatures that only have biologically-
based intentionality cannot have contentful attitudes. Thus if we accept the ‘Content 
Requirement’ they do not qualify as believers. This result fits snugly with the idea that to 
be a believer demands “the gift of tongues” (Davidson 1985, p. 473). A variety of 
arguments are offered for thinking that mastery of complex language is necessary for 
having thoughts with the requisite content, i.e. needed for having truth evaluable attitudes 
– i.e. beliefs – about how things stand with the world (for further discussion see Hutto 
1999 ch. 5, Gauker 2011). Whatever one makes of such arguments, restricting the class 
of believers to the class of language users is apparently at odds with our actual 
attributional practice. We are quite at home in making attributions of beliefs when 
witnessing only non-verbal attitudes in the commerce of everyday life.  
In making everyday attributions, when an individual’s responses are sophisticated 
enough we readily regard such contentless but directed attitudes as doxastic states of 
mind – i.e. as beliefs. It has been argued that classifying an attitude as a belief, based on 
purely non-linguistic behavioural factors, is a mistake; albeit one that we are naturally 
inclined to make (Gendler 2008b, p. 564). Gendler (2008b) holds that this tendency is the 
result of “an overextension of a heuristic: it depends on treating something that is a 
general indicator of belief [i.e. exhibiting a certain non-verbal behavioural profile] as if it 
were a necessary and sufficient correlate of belief” (p. 566).  
In line with Davidson’s sentiments, Gendler thinks we should reserve the title of belief 
only for states of mind with other features as well: “belief aims to ‘track truth’ in the 
sense that belief is subject to immediate revision in the face of changes in our all-things-
considered evidence” (Gendler 2008b, p. 565). But softening the blow, she also holds 
that if we insist on this criterion then it turns out non-verbal attitudes (those with an 
appropriate behavioural profile and motivational force) are not beliefs, they are only 
belief-like states: they are aliefs.  
To have an alief is, to a reasonable approximation, to have an innate or habitual 
propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. It is to be in a mental 
state that is … associative, automatic and arational. As a class, aliefs are states that we 
share with nonhuman animals; they are developmentally and conceptually antecedent to 
other cognitive attitudes that the creature may go on to develop. Typically, they are also 
affect-laden and action-generating (Gendler 2008b, p. 557).  
The apparent good news is that since beliefs and aliefs are different kinds of mental state, 
there is no difficulty in believing that P, while alieving its contrary. This appears to be 
good news because it explains some otherwise puzzling cases. For example, an avowed 
anti-racist, McX, explicitly and sincerely believes and asserts that the members of all 
races deserve the same respect and treatment, but McX harbours an alief with 
representational content that apparently opposes this. More importantly, McX’s alief is 
also an attitude with a different behavioural profile – as revealed by McX’s startle 
responses to Caucasian and African faces.  
The trouble is that in positing aliefs, so characterized, one still encounters the major 
problem that makes the positing of non-verbal beliefs problematic: How to account for 
their content? For, as Gendler defines them, aliefs are contentful belief-like states. 
Paradigmatic aliefs, we are told, have content that is representational, affective and 
behavioural. Thus the frog’s chasing of BBs “can be explained by an alief with the 
content that might be expressed, among other ways, as follows: The frog alieves (all at 
once, in a single alief): small round black object up ahead; appealing in foody sort of 
way; move tongue in its direction” (Gendler 2008b, p. 559).  
By assuming that aliefs are different kinds of attitude Gendler’s proposal avoids the sting 
of contradiction in having to assume that an individual is capable of both believing that P 
while believing that ~ P at the same time. But it doesn’t avoid all of the problems. 
Indeed, it takes us back to square one on the issue of non-verbal contents. For how can 
we justify such ascriptions of non-verbal content – not just epistemically and 
interpretatively, but metaphysically?  
The lesson of the last section is that the best chance for providing a metaphysically 
satisfactory theory of non-linguistic content – teleosemantics – has failed. Yet from the 
ashes teleosemiotics is born. And this is good enough for understanding intentionality if 
not intensionality. But to understand the kind of directedness of the non-verbal attitudes 
this suffices. To quote that famous Rolling Stones lyric, “You can’t always get what you 
want, but if you try sometimes, you just might find, you get what you need”.  
In short, there are powerful reasons to think that non-linguistic forms of cognition are 
contentless (in the relevant sense): they lack non-derived intensionality. Despite this, they 
exhibit a basic kind of intentional directedness toward states of affairs. Organisms are 
fashioned to act successfully (often enough, in historically normal environments) by 
responding to objects or states of affairs in ways mediated by their sensitivity to natural 
signs. These ways of responding can be extended by habit, imagination, and individual 
learning. But they do not involve contentfully representing the objects or states of affairs 
in question.  
So, at this point “why shouldn’t one just give up on talk of truth conditions in connection 
with the thought of lower animals?” (Putnam 1992, p. 32). The answer is simple. We 
should.  
Indeed, we should adopt the same line with respect to attributions of any other kind of 
content to non-verbal attitudes. What follows? It surely follows that purely non-verbal 
attitudes are not propositional attitudes. But does it follow that non-verbal attitudes are 
not beliefs? No. The notion of belief at play in our everyday, folk psychological practice 
is more flexible and inclusive than the notion of propositional attitude, and that gives us 
room to maneuver.  
We can reject the idea of positing contentful belief-like attitudes in order to deal with 
puzzling cases of belief ascription in favour of acknowledging the existence of both 
contentful and contentless beliefs. Not only is this independently motivated by the 
considerations sketched above, it sits well with our existing attributional practices – or at 
least it makes good sense of them without any need for major reform.  
5. Intentional Attitudes: The Ur-category of Belief  
My proposal is that we accept that our quotidian notion of belief is broad church – it 
includes pure, contentless intentional attitudes as well as contentful, linguistically 
mediated intentional attitudes – or propositional attitudes proper. Still there is something 
-a common core – to any and all attitudes worthy of being counted as beliefs. Minimally 
and necessarily, all beliefs are intentional attitudes. All beliefs are directed at some 
possible situation or state of affairs. Whatever else a belief is, it is an intentional attitude 
of some sort.  
The notion of an intentional attitude is the Ur-category that encompasses both contentless 
and contentful, intensional attitudes that are directed towards possible situations. Within 
this class we can distinguish beliefs-as-pure-intentional attitudes and beliefs-as-
propositional attitudes (Hutto 1999, pp. 109–110). This analysis has important 
advantages. It has the potential to explain some important differences between states of 
mind that are pure intentional attitudes as opposed to propositional attitudes. It offers a 
straight explanation why there is no direct way to alter pure intentional attitudes by direct 
rational means, such as argument or rhetorical persuasion. If an individual’s belief is a 
pure intentional attitude it is not contentful. Hence it will not enter into standard logical 
relations and thus is open to revision by rational means.  
It is artificial to count only articulable sentential or propositional attitudes, those of the 
sort we can profess or avow as beliefs. Indeed, there has been much recent discussion 
about this, driven by concerns about how best to characterize the states of mind of 
individuals whose overall patterns of speech and action suggest both that they ought to be 
ascribed the belief that P and the conflicting attitude of believing ~ P.  
These kinds of cases crop up in the daily lives of normally developing, language using 
adult human beings on a regular basis (unsurprisingly, on my view, since we – unlike 
other animals – are capable of having both pure intentional as well as propositional 
attitudes). In a recent discussion, Schwitzgebel (2010) provides a tidy set of examples 
that include: Juliet the implicit racist; Kaipeng the trembling Stoic; and Ben the forgetful 
driver. I will not delay over the details – I recommend reading Schwitzgebel’s paper if 
anyone is interested in these. What matters is that the cases are all quite ordinary and that 
they exhibit a common form. In each one, on the one hand, we have grounds for thinking 
that the individual in question truly and sincerely believes that P based on his or her 
explicit avowals, linguistic utterances and range of related behaviours. Yet, on the other 
hand, there are equally compelling grounds for thinking that he or she believes that ~ P, 
when we consider his or her more spontaneous and non-linguistically mediated reactions 
and responses. So we encounter this puzzle:  
With genuine conviction and complete sincerity you endorse some proposition P. Every 
time you think about P, you reaffirm it; to you, it seems unquestionably true. Yet if we 
look at the overall arc of your behavior – at your automatic and implicit reactions, at your 
decisions, at your spontaneous remarks on nearby topics – there’s a decidedly un-P-ish 
cast. What should we say you believe in such cases? (Schwitzgebel 2010, p. 531).  
None of the answers proposed to date are wholly satisfactory. Schwitzgebel (2010) 
reveals this, providing useful analysis of the existing options, which are:  
The pro-judgment view, on which the subject believes that P and fails to believe ~ P 
(Zimmerman, 2007; Gendler, 2008a, 2008b); The anti-judgment view, on which the 
subject fails to believe that P and instead believes ~ P (Hunter, 2009); The shifting view, 
on which the subject shifts between believing P and believing ~ P (Rowbottom, 2007), 
and; The contradictory belief view, on which the subject believes both P and ~ P (Gertler, 
forthcoming; maybe Sommers, 2009). (p. 537)  
The problems with these accounts are easy to see. The contradictory belief view is 
particularly difficult to swallow. It takes the line of least resistance with respect to the 
full set of evidence but requires acceptance that the individuals in question occupy 
contradictory states of mind. But it is difficult to understand, let alone accept, how it is 
possible to be in literally contradictory states of mind. 
The shifting view is equally implausible. It assumes that individuals have shifting 
attitudes: beliefs that alter with the context, such that the person in question 
determinately believes that P on some occasions but switches to determinately believing 
that ~ P on other occasions. This is hard to square with the general conviction that beliefs 
are dispositional states of mind. Yet if that is accepted its difficult to make sense of the 
idea that an individual’s beliefs can shift in the required ways. For in taking stock of his 
or her wider, longer term patterns of counterfactual behavior will require making both 
belief attributions.  
The remaining views – the pro and anti-judgment views – are mirror images of one 
another and both suffer from the same flaw. Each gains all of its credibility by laying 
stress, unevenly and unjustifiably, on one or other aspect of an individual’s tendencies 
and patterns of behavior in order to justify a preferred belief ascription at the expense of, 
and thus ignoring, a whole other range of the individual’s tendencies – tendencies which 
suggest that exactly the opposite belief ascription is justified.5 Schwitzgebel (2010) 
summarizes the central problem with these proposals very neatly:  
in real cases of the sort at hand, the divisions between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ or daily 
behavior and mere talk are likely to prove messy, the cognitive patterns unstable, our 
attempts to clean it up with sharp distinctions likely to fail or to apply only to a minority 
of cases. Zimmerman and Gendler privilege the intellectual aspect of a person’s 
psychology in belief ascription, while Hunter privileges the in-the-world spontaneous 
behavior. But I recommend that we treat both as an important part of what it is to believe. 
Shouldn’t belief be seen as what animates my limbs and my mouth, what shows itself 
diversely in my action and my reasoning and my emotional responses, not just in some 
pried off subclass of these things? (p. 542)  
In light of this, Schwitzgebel recommends “regarding cases like these as vague, or (as [he 
prefers] to say) in-between, such that careful description of the subject’s mental state 
requires refraining from either ascribing or denying belief” (ibid, p. 533, emphasis 
original). What his observation correctly underlines is that as long as we stick with our 
everyday ascriptive practices we will have reason to ascribe a belief-as-propositional-
attitude that P to certain individuals while at the same time ascribing them a belief-as-
intentional attitude that is directed at the same state of affairs in ways that apparently 
performatively conflict with the person’s professed belief. That is the correct way to 
capture the tension between the separate, first order states of mind of these individuals. 
But we need neither ascribe a single belief with an indeterminate or in-between content, 
nor two beliefs with contradictory contents, nor a conflict between a contentful belief and 
contentful belief-like attitude. What we are dealing with is a tension between a contentful 
propositional attitude and a contentless purely intentional attitude. The really urgent and 
pressing practical question is by what means – if direct rational means is ruled out – can 
one bring one’s pure intentional attitudes in line with one’s professed, linguistically 
based beliefs.  
Apart from providing an attractive solution to the ascriptive puzzles, this analysis 
reminds us that it is not the notion of belief-as-propositional (sentential)-attitude that 
ultimately unifies the motley crew of things we are unguardedly inclined to call beliefs 
(pace Ratcliffe 2007, 2008). Rather it is the more inclusive idea of an attitude directed at 
a particular state of affairs that does such work. Moreover, it shows us how such 
unification is possible while allowing that believing comes in many forms.  
References  
Armstrong, D. M., 1973, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press Bermúdez, J.L., 2011, The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-
Human Primates, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, pp.397–410 Carruthers, P., 
1998, Language, Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Carruthers, P., 2009a, Mindreading underlies Metacognition, Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 32, pp. 121–182  
Carruthers, P., 2009b, Invertebrate Concepts Confront the Generality Constraint (and 
Win), in The Philosophy of Animal Minds, (Ed R. Lurz), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 89-107  
Crary, A., 2012, Dogs and Concepts, Philosophy, 87(340), pp. 215-237  
Cummins R., Blackmon, J., Bird, D., Lee, A. and Roth M., 2006, Representation and 
Unexploited Content, in Teleosemantics, (Eds G Macdonald, D Papineau), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 195-207  
Davidson, D., 1985, Rational Animals in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Eds E. Lepore and B. MacLaughlin), Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell  
Fodor, J. A., 1990a/2008, Information and Representation in Information, Language and 
Cognition: Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Vol. 1, (Ed P. Hanson), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp.175-190 (Reprinted in 2008, Mind and Cognition, (Eds 
Lycan, W. and Prinz, J.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp.95-104. Page reference to reprinted 
version)  
Fodor, J.A., 1990b, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge MA: MIT Press  
Fodor, J., 1991, Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation in The Future of Folk 
Psychology, J. Greenwood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.22-50  
Fodor, J. A., 2007, The Revenge of the Given in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of 
Mind, (Eds B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp.105-116  
Fodor J.A., 2008, Against Darwinism, Mind and Language, 23,pp.1-24  
Fodor J.A., 2009, Where is my mind?, London Review of Books, 12 Feb 2009  
Gauker, C., 2011, Words and Images. An Essay on the Origin of Ideas. Oxford 
University Press.  
Gendler, T., 2008a, Alief and Belief, Journal of Philosophy, 105, pp. 634–63  
Gendler T., 2008b, Alief in Action (and Reaction), Mind and Language, 23 (5), pp.552-
585  
Gertler, B., forthcoming, Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief, in (Ed A. 
Hatzimoysis), Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford  
Godfrey-Smith, P., 2006, Mental Representation, Naturalism and Teleosemantics in 
Teleosemantics, (Eds G Macdonald, D Papineau), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
42-68  
Hunter, D., 2009, Belief, Alienation, and Intention, unpublished manuscript  
Hutto, D.D., 1999, The Presence of Mind, Amsterdam: John Benjamins  
Hutto, D.D., 2003/2006, Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory Nor 
Therapy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
Hutto, D.D., 2008a, Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16, pp.419-444  
Hutto, D.D., 2008b, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Socio-Cultural Basis of 
Understanding Reasons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press  
Hutto, D.D., 2011, Philosophy of Mind’s New Lease on Life: Autopoietic Enactivism 
meets Teleosemiotics, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(5-6), pp.44-64  
Hutto, D.D., 2012, Exposing The Background: Deep and Local, in (Ed Z. Radman), 
Knowing without Thinking: The Background in Philosophy of Mind, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, pp.37-56  
Hutto, D.D., Myin, E., 2013, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press  
Jackson, F., Pettit, P., 1993, Some Content is Narrow, in Mental Causation, (Eds J Heil, 
A Mele), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 259-282  
Jacob, P., 1997, What Minds Can Do, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
James, W., 1909, The Meaning of Truth, New York: Longman, Green, and Co.  
Matthen, M., 2006, Teleosemantics and the Consumer, in Teleosemantics (Eds G. 
MacDonald and D. Papineau), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.146-166  
McDowell, J., 1994/1998, The Content of Perceptual Experience, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 44(175), pp.190-205. (Reprinted in 1998 in Mind, Value and Reality, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 341-358. Page references to reprinted 
version)  
Millikan, R.G., 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press  
Millikan, R.G., 1993, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press  
Millikan, R.G., 2004, Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod lectures, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press  
Millikan, R.G., 2005, Language: A Biological Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Putnam, H., 1992, Renewing Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press  
Ramsey, W.M., 2007, Representation Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press  
Ratcliffe, M., 2007, Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk 
Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan\  
Ratcliffe, M., 2008. Farwell to Folk Psychology: A Response to Hutto. International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16(3), 445–451.  
Rowbottom, D., 2007, In-Between Believing and Degrees of Belief, Teorema, 26, pp. 
131– 137  
Rowlands, M., 2006, Body Language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press  
Schwitzgebel, E., 2010, Acting Contrary to our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf between 
Occurent Judgement and Dispositional Belief, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 
pp.531–553  
Seager, W., 2000, Theories of Consciousness, London: Routledge  
Searle J.,1983, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
Shapiro, L., 2011, Embodied cognition, London: Routledge  
Sommers, F., 2009, Dissonant Beliefs, Analysis, 69, pp.267–274  
Stalnaker, R., 1998, What Might Nonconceptual Content be?, Philosophical Issues, 9, 
pp.339352  
Stich, S., 1979, Do Animals Have Beliefs?, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, 
pp.15-28  
Wheeler, M., 2005, Reconstructing the Cognitive World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press  
Williams, B., 1973, Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
Williamson, T., 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell  
Zimmerman, A., 2007, The Nature of Belief, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14.11, 
pp. 61–82  
Notes  
1 Non-verbal attitudes are an appropriate focus because they are defined, by stipulation, 
as attitudes that target situations but without the involvement of capacities relating to the 
use of natural language.  
2 
Crary (2012) advocates adopting a notion of concept that is “flexible enough to enable 
us to accommodate the prospect of finding that some non-rational animals are concept-
users” (p. 217).  
3 
As Matthen (2006) observes that ‘representation’ is “a new and controversial concept 
… The natural home of this concept is in the study of communication between agents 
who possess intentions and goals. It is not immediately clear how it can be extended to 
states issued by automatic sub-personal systems” (p. 147).  
4 
Putnam puts it, punchily, “Evolution didn’t ‘design’ dogs’ ideas to be true or false, it 
designed them to be successful or unsuccessful” (Putnam 1992, p. 31).  
5 
Schwitzgebel (2010) puts his finger on the problems with each of these proposals. “The 
fundamental problem with the pro-judgment view is that it artificially hives off our 
rational and thoughtful responses from our habitual, automatic, and associative ones … 
People judge in part automatically, associatively, and arationally, and they often show 
high intelligence in their habits and their unreflective, spontaneous responses” (p. 540). 
By way of contrast, the anti-judgement view “omits what the subject explicitly endorses, 
how she is disposed to judge the overall state of affairs all things considered, what side 
she would take in an argument, how she is disposed to reason about the case in reflective 
moments, her best conscious assessment of the evidence. All these, furthermore, will 
often be intertwined with daily behavior, even if not dependably” (p. 542).  
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